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The pre-World  War I gold standard and the Bretton Woods system are 
the closest approximations to a constitution for the international mon- 
etary system that the world has experienced. By a constitution I mean 
established rules, whether or not a written instrument embodies the 
rules. No such written instrument embodied the gold standard rules. 
Individual countries determined at discrete times that their national 
interest would be served by assuming the obligation to live by the rules 
imposed by  adherence to the gold  standard.  The international gold 
standard evolved gradually as an organic development during roughly 
three decades before World War I without any overall design coordi- 
nated by a supranational agency. 
Rules were embodied in a formal constitution for Bretton Woods. 
Although  membership in  the Bretton  Woods system was voluntary, 
there were compelling inducements, to be discussed at a later point, 
for countries to participate in a consciously planned arrangement for 
the international monetary system that was to last for a quarter of a 
century. The impersonality of rules without a formal constitution con- 
trasts with the role of bureaucrats interpreting the rules of a formal 
constitution. 
Currently  two views have  been  advanced  concerning the way  to 
achieve a constitution for the international monetary system. One view 
is that stable international arrangements can only develop as individual 
countries adopt appropriate monetary and fiscal policies that stabilize 
their own economies. The alternative view is that rules governing in- 
ternational monetary behavior must first be agreed upon by key coun- 
tries and that adherence to those rules by the contracting parties and 
additional countries will in turn produce national monetary stability. 
The gold standard appears to conform to the first view, the Bretton 
Woods system to the second view. 
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The pre-World  War I gold standard and the Bretton Woods system 
are only two of many international monetary arrangements that were 
proposed over the past century and either implemented or not imple- 
mented. Earlier proposals include: 
1) the attempt to institute a form of international bimetallism dur- 
ing the secular deflation of the last quarter of the nineteenth century; 
2)  the proposals the British delegation presented  to the  Genoa 
Conference that met between April 10 and May 19, 1922, with the 
participation of thirty-three governments, the United States present 
unofficially; 
3)  circumscribed monetary arrangements such as the Latin Mon- 
etary Union of 1866-78, the Scandinavian Monetary Union of 1873- 
1914, the Tripartite  Monetary  Agreement  of  September 25,  1936, 
among six participating  countries,  and the creation on March  13, 
1979, of the European Monetary System-replacing  the “snake,” 
the European joint float. 
It is instructive to review the past record. What light does it shed 
on the prospects for implementation of the crop of proposals that are 
currently advocated to reform international monetary arrangements? 
These range from variants of a gold standard to consolidating the money 
supplies of the United States, Japan, and West Germany (McKinnon 
1984), to the creation of a common currency for all the industrial de- 
mocracies with a common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue 
(Cooper 1984), to the issue of a new international monetary unit by 
private money producers (Hayek 1984). 
To determine why certain international monetary arrangements were 
adopted and others not, section 16.1 assesses the costs and benefits of 
those international monetary proposals that were implemented in the 
past, and section 16.2 of those that were never implemented. Section 
16.3 applies the lessons that emerge from the past to current proposals 
for  international monetary  reform.  Which,  if  any,  are likely  to be 
adopted? Section 16.4 gives a summary that appraises the two views 
on how to achieve international monetary reform. 
16.1  Why  Were Certain International Monetary 
Proposals Implemented? 
In the century before World War I the international monetary system 
was simply the aggregation of monetary preferences of individual coun- 
tries. Most countries chose a bimetallic monetary system before they 
shifted to the gold standard during the final decades of the nineteenth 
century, although in some cases fiat money episodes punctuated their 
adherence to a commodity standard. Commodity standards imposed 
rules requiring each government to define its monetary unit as a spec- 393  Lessons of the Gold Standard Era 
ified weight of gold or silver, or of gold and silver, leaving banks free 
to produce money convertible into central bank money or government 
money issues that were in turn convertible into the standard metal or 
metals. 
The chief benefit for countries that adopted the gold standard at the 
close of the nineteenth century was access to capital markets, centered 
in London, Paris, or Berlin. That benefit was invaluable for developing 
countries, which was the stage of economic maturity of most countries 
at the time. The chief cost, as viewed at the time, was the need to 
acquire a gold reserve. Except for Germany, which obtained it as the 
war indemnity from France in  1870-71,  countries borrowed at home 
and abroad to get the funds with which to buy gold. The standing as 
a debtor the country achieved by  embracing  the gold  standard far 
outweighed the interest cost of such borrowing. 
With  that  choice made,  governments  did  not  have  to coordinate 
policies they adopted explicitly, in pursuit of their national economic 
interest. Coordination was achieved by the maintenance of converti- 
bility, which  fixed exchange rates between  national monetary  units 
within narrow limits, with no external agency guiding the result. Na- 
tional price levels moved in close harmony. It was no myth of the gold 
standard world, as some latter-day critics describe it, that people, goods, 
capital, and money moved with reasonable freedom across national 
boundaries.  International monetary arrangements reflected  the inde- 
pendent choices of countries linked by market forces. 
That world came to an end in World War I. I now turn to the cost- 
benefit reasons that account for the adoption of the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system. 
The international monetary system that was designed at the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944 reflected professional views on the defects 
of the arrangements that had prevailed in the 1930s. The aim was to 
avoid in the postwar world protectionist trade policies, exchange con- 
trols, and competitive currency depreciation that had infected the pre- 
World War I1 period. The goals of the system created by the delegates 
to the conference accordingly were the removal of controls on trade 
and payments under a system of fixed exchange rates, with adjustment 
of parities limited to “fundamental disequilibrium”  in the balance of 
payments.  The lending facilities of the International Monetary Fund 
were to be available to supplement IMF members’ gold and foreign 
exchange reserves in order to provide liquidity to overcome temporary 
balance of payments deficits. 
The system was designed to operate with the United States as the 
reserve currency country. Other countries would peg their currencies 
to the dollar. Stable economic policy in the United States would assure 
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The Bretton Woods  system initially conferred many benefits  and 
imposed few costs on IMF members. The attitude of the United States 
was paternalistic. Wartime destruction and disruption had left countries 
in Europe and Asia with limited productive capacity and swelled the 
immediate postwar demand for U.S. exports. To promote economic 
recovery in the rest of the world, the United States encouraged an 
outflow of dollars by official U.S.  aid, military spending, and private 
investment. The United States did not protest discriminatory tariff and 
quota restrictions that Western European countries applied. As Europe 
and Japan recovered, the U.S. balance of payments turned negative. 
The United States resorted to capital controls and restrictions on do- 
mestic gold convertibility but still regarded the deficit in its balance of 
payments as a contribution to international liquidity. The overvaluation 
of the dollar and the decline in the competitiveness of U.S.  exports 
came to be regarded as an intolerable cost only at a later stage in the 
evolution of the Bretton Woods system. 
For the nonreserve currency countries, the benefits were the obverse 
of the costs from the perspective of the United States. A weakening 
of the U.S. balance of payments was acceptable to other countries as 
long as they desired surpluses in their balance of payments in order to 
add to their dollar reserves. Once assets denominated in dollars grew 
in excess of the demand for them by the rest of the world, nonreserve- 
currency countries insisted on action by the United States to right its 
balance of payments. They held that accelerating inflation in the United 
States from the mid-1960s on undermined price stability in their econ- 
omies. The system  collapsed amid growing doubts that the  United 
States would be able to maintain external gold convertibility. 
Although nonreserve-currency  countries were unwilling as a group 
to adopt the inflationary policies the United States was pursuing, the 
dispersion of inflation rates among them enforced more frequent changes 
of exchange rates. Yet countries with strong exports and weak imports 
resisted revaluation of their currencies, and other countries with weak 
exports and excessive imports delayed changes in par values until a 
foreign exchange crisis developed. Parity changes were basically uni- 
lateral decisions. This latitude for national discretion initially made the 
system acceptable but ultimately eroded its vitality. 
Having  considered  the two global approaches to an international 
monetary constitution, I now turn to the reasons more circumscribed 
collaborative monetary  arrangements have been implemented. Here 
the limited objectives are usually spelled out, and the advantages to 
the participating countries are clear. The currency areas involved are 
optimum in the limited sense of the goals sought. 
One example is the Latin Monetary Union, effective August  1866, 
that was formed by France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy, and sub- 395  Lessons of the Gold Standard Era 
sequently gained additional members. The union achieved its limited 
objective to standardize the fineness of currencies of five-franc pieces 
that were then issued by each of the countries on the bimetallic stan- 
dard. The coins in various other denominations as well were to circulate 
freely throughout the union. However, a fall in the price of silver led 
to the reduced coinage of standard silver pieces in  1874 and its dis- 
continuation in  1878. Bimetallism’s sun set, but  the union  was not 
formally dissolved until 1925. 
A gold-based  monetary  union  to replace the  silver standard was 
created by Denmark and Sweden in May 1873 and joined by Norway 
in October 1875. The Scandinavian Monetary Union established a com- 
mon currency unit, the Scandinavian krona. The monetary agreement 
among the three participants provided that gold coins, as well as com- 
mon  subsidiary silver and copper coins, were legal tender in all of 
them, no matter in which country the coins were minted. The three 
central banks accepted each other’s notes at par and settled balances 
through a clearing system. It has been noted that no closer monetary 
cooperation was achieved by the union than would have been the case 
had  each country independently adopted the gold  standard (Jonung 
1984). This conclusion holds if  the only consideration is the fixed ex- 
change rates the gold  standard sets.  However, the monetary  union 
contributed the additional feature of eliminating national currency dis- 
tinctions. The union was dissolved by World War I. 
Another example of a limited international monetary constitution is 
the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of 1936. The initial French proposal 
including fixed parities and eventual return to gold convertibility was 
turned down by the United States and Britain as limiting their freedom 
to manage  exchange  rates.  Instead,  an  agreement  of  lesser  scope 
emerged. Following the French devaluation in September, the chief 
participants used their exchange stabilization funds to manage fluctua- 
tions in the exchange rates rather than permitting  market forces to 
determine exchange rates. To prevent management at cross purposes, 
with risk  of exchange losses from independent management tactics, 
the three initial participants-France,  Great Britain,  and the United 
States-signed  a Gold Agreement on October 12-13.  It provided that 
each country would cable the other two the price of its own currency 
at which  it  would buy  and  sell gold, and the three exchange funds 
would decide on a common currency to be bought for gold or sold and 
converted into gold at the specified price at the close of the business 
day. The quotations were valid for twenty-four hours, so there was no 
risk of exchange loss during the interval. Belgium, Holland, and Swit- 
zerland subsequently subscribed to the agreement. Not permitting mar- 
ket forces to determine exchange rates left intervention open to ex- 
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at an agreed but changeable price eliminated  exchange risk  for the 
authorities without sacrificing exchange rate flexibility. A student of 
the agreement concludes, “In 1936, each country’s interests, as inter- 
preted by the government in power, was virtually the sole criterion for 
public policy”  (Clark  1977, p. 57). In particular, the French Popular 
Front found the agreement useful as a coverup for elusive economic 
recovery and the need for franc devaluation. For all the governments, 
the agreement provided “exchange market management with autonomy 
of national policy” (Eichengreen 1985, p.  171). 
The final example of a limited international monetary constitution is 
the ongoing effort to achieve European monetary union.  When con- 
vertibility of the dollar was formally suspended in August 1971, EEC 
countries sought to narrow fluctuations among their currencies vis-a- 
vis the devalued dollar, and again, after the Smithsonian Agreement of 
December 1971, against the dollar and other non-European currencies. 
The so-called snake was intended to achieve fixed exchange parities 
among the EEC countries by a convergence of economic and monetary 
policies. The snake was not viable because the national governments 
were not willing to yield to the union direct monetary autonomy and 
control over exchange rates changes or, alternatively, to achieve close 
convergence of economic policies. The snake was succeeded by the 
European Monetary System in March 1979. The center of the system 
is the European Currency Unit, a basket of nine currencies, issued by 
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund in an amount equal to a 
deposit of 20% of each participating country’s gold and dollar reserves 
to be used in settlement of international debts. Two groups of countries 
are allied in the EMS-Denmark,  Belgium, Germany, and the Neth- 
erlands in the low-inflation group, and France and Italy in the high- 
inflation group-with  the remaining countries in between. Both sets of 
countries profit from the alliance. In the EMS no currency can reach 
the top of  the  permitted range  without  some other currency  at the 
bottom, so Germany, for example, would not be forced to inflate be- 
cause the DM was strong, without pressure on France, say, because 
the franc was weak to limit its inflation. The high-inflation countries 
periodically must devalue but limit the extent of their currency change 
by the revaluation of the low-inflation countries. Similarly, the extent 
of the revaluation by the low-inflation countries is limited, so the effect 
on their export growth is smaller than might otherwise be the case. It 
is a strength of the system that it imposes parity changes on both weak 
and strong currencies but does not free the weak ones from the need 
to adjust internal prices and costs. 
A less sanguine view of the operation of the EMS has been advanced 
(Shafer 1985, pp. 362-65).  The critic questions its contribution to mac- 
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the  “fundamental  agenda”  behind  the  EMS-“momentum  towards 
greater political and economic unification in the community”-has  been 
fostered by the system. He finds little evidence that collaboration is 
growing and cites capital controls and intra-EEC trade restrictions as 
holding the system together. The presence of such influences on the 
willingness of member countries to remain within the EMS would not 
contradict the theme of self-interest of my approach. 
International monetary arrangements are implemented, the preced- 
ing global examples  suggest, only when national economic interests 
are not  subordinated.  Even U.S.  paternalism  at the genesis  of  the 
Bretton  Woods arrangements was  not  fundamentally  altruistic.  The 
United States intended to establish world economic relations according 
to its lights for a brave new monetary order. 
Limited international monetary agreements are adopted when the 
commitments by the participants are in their short-term interest. The 
proposals that were implemented did not encroach on the independence 
of participating governments to formulate domestic policies. Individual 
governments retained freedom of action, constrained only by the com- 
mitment each had made with respect to a well-defined external mon- 
etary arrangement. 
16.2  Why  Were Selected International Monetary Proposals 
Not Implemented? 
One failed attempt to design a constitution for the international mon- 
etary  system was the campaign to institute a form  of  international 
bimetallism during the last quarter of  the nineteenth century. Inter- 
national conferences in 1878, 1881, and 1892, the Gold and Silver Com- 
mission in England in 1886, and a Silver Commission in Germany were 
organized by proponents of bimetallism who touted the system for its 
virtue, compared to a monometallic system, in reducing commodity 
price fluctuations. The attempt to induce nations to give up the gold 
standard for a bimetallic standard offered that benefit, but the propo- 
nents could not effectively counter the arguments of the opponents. 
The countries of the world that  had recently demonetized silver in 
response to enormous increases in the supply of  silver were uncon- 
vinced by the intellectual demonstration that substitution between mon- 
etary and nonmonetary uses of gold and silver would bring the market 
ratio of gold to silver into equilibrium with the mint ratio. Actual ex- 
perience instead indicated that a bimetallic standard alternated between 
a monometallic gold standard and a monometallic silver standard. Ad- 
vocates  of  bimetallism,  who  included  silver mine  owners, debtors, 
farmers, and politicians representing these constituents, were regarded 
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in the United States was potent enough to increase the deflationary 
pressure on the economy. No other country was subject to equal agi- 
tation to force restoration of a monetary role to silver. In the event, 
the enormous increase in gold output that began in the 1890s ultimately 
produced a 40% increase in prices between 1896 and 1913 and doomed 
the bimetallism initiative. 
The other failed attempt to restructure the international monetary 
system that merits comment was the set of proposals that the British 
delegation presented to the 1922 Genoa Conference of thirty-three gov- 
ernments (Federal  Reserve Bulletin,  1922). The objective of the pro- 
posals was to restore the international monetary system that had existed 
before the war, with London at the center, and nonreserve center coun- 
tries authorized to hold their reserves partly in foreign exchange.  A 
global approach to the international monetary system was rejected by 
the conference, mainly owing to U.S.  opposition expressed by Ben- 
jamin Strong, the key figure at the time in U.S. international as well 
as domestic monetary affairs. One of his objections centered on the 
conflict between the Genoa proposal that monetary policy should at- 
tempt to limit fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold and a central 
bank’s  duty to maintain  domestic monetary  stability. He noted that 
“the regulation of credit for the purpose of maintaining the purchasing 
power of gold or the parity of currencies would imply that the nation 
which had a discount on its currency should undertake, through its 
bank of issue, to bring about a contraction of credit and currency; or, 
as in the present case, the United States with its currency at a premium 
the world over, should undertake, through the Reserve Banks, to reg- 
ulate credit policies, as to expand credit and currency to a point where 
the value of our currency would decline and consequently other cur- 
rencies would approach the value of ours”  (quoted in Clarke  1967, 
p. 37). The proposal had “an ominous sound to” Strong. In addition, 
he wanted assurance that the conference would not place the United 
States in the position  of  “handing  a blank check”  to impoverished 
countries or their banks of issues or governments with disordered fi- 
nances. It was clear to Strong that the policies of central banks would 
“be dictated by the interests of their respective governments rather 
than by purely monetary considerations”  (Clarke 1967, p. 40).  As a 
result, under Strong the United States dealt with monetary stabilization 
problems only on a country-by-country basis. 
One conclusion that emerges from investigating the fate of defeated 
international monetary proposals is that they were judged not to serve 
national interests. The intellectual case supporting a proposal may not 
be convincing, as happened to the proposal to restore bimetallism. The 
existing deflationary experience would have had to be far worse and 
the resurgence of gold output much more delayed for bimetallism to 399  Lessons of the Gold Standard Era 
have won  the day.  The Genoa proposals  got  nowhere because  the 
United States perceived them as undermining its independence to for- 
mulate domestic policy. 
As already  noted,  international  proposals  that  have  been  imple- 
mented have not encroached on national sovereignty in fiscal and mon- 
etary matters.  Bretton Woods mustered  support, given the kinds of 
inducements to countries to participate that that system created, while 
imposing few restrictions on the freedom of action of member govern- 
ments. Modest international monetary proposals that demand surren- 
der of only limited sovereignty, as in the Latin Monetary Union and 
the Tripartite Agreement, are also workable. Whether the EMS is the 
harbinger of a far-reaching integration of national economic policies 
remains to be seen. 
16.3  Prospects for Implementing Current International 
Monetary Proposals 
Padoa Schioppa has contrasted the shift in the 1970s to emphasis on 
rules for domestic macroeconomic policy-targeting  money aggregates 
rather than fine-tuning money growth, and pressure for a constitutional 
amendment to achieve a balanced fiscal budget-and  the shift to em- 
phasis on discretion for international macroeconomic policy, particu- 
larly the conduct of exchange rate policy (Padoa Schioppa 1985, pp. 332- 
34). In the international sphere, however, the shift is not unambiguously 
a movement from rules to discretion. Had a shift from fixed exchange 
rates to pure floating occurred, it would not have been accurately char- 
acterized as a movement from rules to discretion but rather from one 
rule to another. It is the shift to discretionary management of the floating 
system that is the true contrast with the tendencies to introduce rules 
in the domestic sphere. 
Critics of  the managed floating exchange rate system include both 
those who favor and those who do not favor rules to correct what are 
perceived to be imperfections of the system. The latter endorse more 
discretionary intervention than has been practiced. The indictment of 
the existing system is threefold: allegedly it has produced large and 
prolonged misalignments of exchange rates, the prime example being 
the dollar’s rise from 1980 to 1985, which, it is claimed, has misdirected 
trade, direct investment, and international capital flows; has led to the 
accumulation of balance-of-payments deficits by the United States with 
unfortunate repercussions on the rest of the world; and fostered in- 
creased volatility of exchange rates under floating that has encouraged 
speculation, though research fails to show that it has hampered trade. 
Those who argue for more discretionary intervention applaud the 
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Group of Five committed themselves to greater cooperation to drive 
down the external value of the dollar, as if  market forces were not 
already producing that result. A favorite extension of the interventionist 
approach is the establishment by the authorities of target or reference 
zones that would define the range of parities that ought to exist (Wil- 
liamson  1983; Roosa 1984). When nominal market exchange rates de- 
viate from the target zones that are themselves alterable, the authorities 
would decide on intervention moves. I exclude this type of proposal 
from consideration here. Discretion has a large role in this approach. 
I limit my discussion to proposals that would impose some type of rule 
on international monetary behavior. Nor am I concerned with the va- 
lidity of the criticisms of the managed floating exchange rate system 
as it exists. My interest is only in the probability that governments will 
agree to live by the rules that would be established by the sample of 
current proposals that I have chosen-by  Hall, McKinnon, Cooper, 
and Hayek. 
Various proposals exist (Laffer 1980; Paul and Lehrman 1982; Mun- 
dell 1981) to return to a conventional gold standard or Bretton Woods 
System-the  dollar would be defined as a specified weight in gold, and 
the United States would announce the price at which it would buy and 
sell gold. Presumably an international gold standard could be created 
if  other governments adopted one of these proposals along with the 
United States. The proposals differ mainly in the choice of the price 
of gold to be announced. The costs and benefits of adopting the gold 
standard that prevailed at the close of the nineteenth century are today 
irrelevant.  Neither the costs of accumulating a gold reserve nor the 
benefits of capital market access dominate the debate about the merits 
of restoring the gold standard. The issues today center on the stability 
of  the purchasing power  of gold, the adequacy of  additions to the 
monetary gold stock in the context of a duopoly of gold producers of 
uncertain political reliability, a host of technical difficulties in selecting 
the price of gold to be pegged, determining exchange rates, and linking 
domestic money supplies to gold. The ultimate hurdle, however, to a 
return to an enduring and effective gold standard is the resistance of 
political authorities and of modem democracies to precommitment and 
to forswearing of discretion. No country has expressed an interest in 
returning to a conventional gold standard. 
Less conventional proposals for a gold standard also have been sug- 
gested.  One would eliminate national monetary units. Each country 
would issue coins of different gold weights, and prices would be quoted 
in weights of gold. In Hall’s proposal, national monetary units would 
continue to exist, but  the promise  to pay,  say dollars,  would  be a 
promise to pay gold or something of  equal purchasing power.  Under 
this proposal presumably someone who borrowed $100 in 1896 would 
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Hall describes his variant as a free market gold standard but dismisses 
it as no less flawed than the conventional variants. Although systematic 
adjustment of the gold content of the dollar could remedy the instability 
of  the purchasing power  of  gold,  the necessity for that adjustment 
detracts from the virtue of the gold standard as an automatic stabilizer 
of the economy. Hall also faults the gold standard for creating an in- 
efficient demand for precautionary balances in gold by banks and other 
financial institutions. He associates pressures to suspend the gold stan- 
dard in the short run and abandon it  in the long run with runs on 
reserves. An international monetary system clearly could be organized 
on gold standard lines if countries regarded the benefits of such a system 
as worth the loss of national monetary independence. 
McKinnon envisions a new international monetary standard. During 
a transition period the United States, Germany, and Japan would each 
choose a domestic money supply growth rate to stabilize nominal ex- 
change rates vis-a-vis the other two currencies. The three countries 
would then jointly target world money growth at a rate that would be 
determined by estimated future GNP growth, trend velocity, and the 
price trend of nontradables in each. Consequently, a weighted sum of 
the money stocks of the three countries would grow at a noninflationary 
rate.  If  exchange rates for a given country appreciated, that would 
indicate the need for that country to expand money growth, compen- 
sated for by a contraction of money growth in the other two countries. 
World money stock would grow at the predetermined target rate, and 
the world price level would be stabilized. 
At a subsequent stage, the world would return to pegged exchange 
rates, and the weighted sum of the money stocks of the three countries 
would grow at a constant rate. 
The basic notion of a collective monetary rule underlying the tran- 
sition phase of McKinnon’s proposal is hard to credit. It reflects his 
acceptance of two propositions for which empirical evidence is far from 
robust: inflation is the product of world, rather than domestic, money 
growth; and the demand for domestic currencies has been destabilized 
by shifts in demand for foreign currencies. Could the United States, 
Germany, and Japan-a  trio without common cultural or political ties 
(unlike EMS constituents)-agree  on a target rate for monetary growth 
of a combined aggregate? Would each country agree to alter its mon- 
etary growth rate to offset the opposite changes in money growth rates 
of the other two countries, particularly if the alteration conflicted with 
domestic goals? Since U.S.  money growth would have the greatest 
weight, it would require a 1.3 percentage point decline in German and 
a 2.5 percentage point decline in Japanese money growth to offset a 1 
percentage point  increase in U.S.  money growth.  Policymakers are 
likely to respond as Benjamin Strong did to the Genoa proposals. They 
may find disturbing simulations of the second stage of the McKinnon 402  Anna J. Schwartz 
rule based on equations for the internal macroeconomic structure of 
the United States, Japan, and the rest of the OECD region (McKibbin 
and Sachs 1986). The reported results include standard deviations of 
output, inflation, the current account, and the fiscal deficit, given shocks 
to aggregate demand, prices, velocity. Unless the shocks across coun- 
tries were negatively correlated, the simulations indicate destabilizing 
effects for the countries whose money stocks decline in response to 
expansions elsewhere. 
Nothing in the historical record or in current developments suggests 
that policymakers in individual countries will take actions in line with 
some blueprint that sacrifices apparent independent national interests. 
Currently the United States is exerting pressure on Germany and Japan 
to push for higher growth as a way of increasing their imports and 
shrinking their trade surpluses. Both countries are resisting for fear of 
a resurgence of inflation and loss of their export markets. If agreement 
is not at hand in this instance, would not rules that enforce such action 
be rejected? 
McKinnon does not date the time for realizing the second stage of 
his proposal. Cooper dates his proposal as a possibility for 2010. He 
visualizes a world monetary union by that time with a single central 
bank,  the rule governing  member nations the simple one that they 
forswear independent monetary policy. 
Cooper believes that one-world money is the answer to the inevitable 
decline in the role of the dollar as the U.S.  role in the world shrinks. 
In addition, national monetary policies will be undermined as improve- 
ments in telecommunications speed capital and even goods flows across 
national  borders.  Fiscal policy  would be  set independently by  each 
country in the new regime,  but deficits would have to be financed, 
beyond a prorated share of the world central bank’s open market pur- 
chases, by borrowing on the world capital market in the one common 
money. World monetary policy would be set by the board of governors 
of the world central bank-probably  finance ministers-but  would not 
be responsible to any one legislature. 
Cooper advocates two transitional steps on the path to the one-money 
regime. One is to enhance the usefulness of SDRs so that they might 
eventually become the one-world money. The way to do so would be 
to give SDRs a role as q private transaction money. The other transi- 
tional step Cooper advocates is to enhance the importance of exchange 
rates in setting monetary policy. The target zone arrangement meets 
with his approval. In the one-money regime balance-of-payments  ad- 
justments would be no more difficult than regional adjustments in the 
United States at present. 
The analogy to monetary union that the United States represents 
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were a comparable world federal government. In the absence of such 
a central political unit or any provision for the emergence of such a 
unit as a precondition for monetary unification, it is hard to conceive 
of the impetus for the creation of a one-money world. No one would 
dispute the argument that a single money issuer for the world, provided 
that it maintained a stable, noninflationary money stock, would improve 
the efficiency of  money. Cooper’s vision does not extend to the need 
for a rule binding the world monetary authority.  Would a single mo- 
nopolistic monetary authority possess the information to govern the 
provision of the appropriate supply of money without a rule? As Cooper 
himself acknowledges, unlike McKinnon, he is not concerned to assure 
behavior by monetary authorities either in a nonunified world or in his 
projected unified world to provide steady, noninflationary money growth. 
His main concern is to limit movements of real exchange rates in the 
existing world economy, and discretionary actions by authorities  to 
achieve that goal are quite acceptable to him pending the arrival of his 
utopia. 
Hayek’s proposal to restructure the international monetary system 
is that governments refrain from issuing and regulating money. Instead, 
competitive private firms would be free to issue money convertible on 
demand in whatever amounts of competing moneys would buy, at mar- 
ket  prices,  collections of  internationally traded commodities whose 
values they would pledge to stabilize. Each issuer would undertake to 
stabilize the value of his money unit in terms of the particular collection 
of raw materials defining the standard unit. Arbitrage would serve to 
eliminate any difference in value between the monetary unit and the 
standard unit. During a transition period, privately issued money units 
would be introduced as transferable deposits redeemable in government 
currency until such time as holders of money abandoned that currency 
and private issuers were allowed to provide currency. 
In a world with competing private issuers, the money units would 
not be identified with particular geographical areas. In this world, as 
in Cooper’s, balance-of-payments problems would not exist. Regional 
differences in distributions of relative and absolute quantities of money 
would arise but would not cause any more difficulties than do similar 
redistributions within a given territory. 
In Hayek’s scheme money producers find it in their self-interest to 
offer stable money with a sphere of circulation encompassing the globe. 
Different  monetary  units  would  circulate only  so long as they  suc- 
cessfully maintained their value in purchasing power. If a money de- 
preciated, courts would determine the amount of some other currency 
to which holders were entitled and oblige the unsuccessful money pro- 
ducer to discharge his debt to them. Even if  holders of a particular 
money were not compensated for the shrinkage of the value of their 404  Anna J. Schwartz 
holdings, the damage would not extend to the rest of the community. 
Hayek thus sees the supply of money as market regulated. 
Many questions arise in connection with Hayek’s scheme. Wouldn’t 
the information costs for agents confronting a variety of competitive 
moneys based on a variety of units of account be an overwhelming 
objection? It is not clear what fixes the price level in the competitive 
money order if  money producers promise only to stabilize the price 
level of alternative collections of commodities. Money producers would 
presumably hold precautionary reserves, but Hayek does not say in 
what form. What assets would money producers hold as the counterpart 
of their liabilities that would enable them to meet their commitments? 
But these questions do not touch the essential objection to his scheme, 
which is, What would induce governments and their policymakers to 
give up a right that they have claimed and exercised for centuries? 
Hayek counts on the market to eliminate governments if  their money 
issues cannot compete in providing purchasing power equal in stability 
to what he expects private money producers to provide. Since not even 
the catastrophe of hyperinflation has hitherto led governments to yield 
to the private sector their power to determine money growth, or the 
private sector to demand such abnegation by governments,  in what 
circumstances would such a revolutionary change be conceivable? 
The four proposals for restructuring the international monetary sys- 
tem based on the conventional or Hall gold standard rule, the Mc- 
Kinnon rule of a collective monetary growth rate, the Cooper rule of 
a one-money world subject to the decisions of a supranational board 
of governors, or a Hayek rule of no government involvement in money 
creation are all far removed from the kinds of  historical rule-based 
global or  limited international monetary agreements reviewed here. The 
proposals do not deal with the self-interest of policymakers and gov- 
ernments to preserve existing power over the choice of domestic ob- 
jectives, or over which policies to adopt to achieve those objectives. 
If policymakers believed that monetary policy had no effect on em- 
ployment in the short run or prices in the long run, then they might 
agree to give up control over monetary policy. But even then, they 
clearly believe that monetary policy has importance in managing in- 
terest and exchange rates. There is no indication currently or in the 
past, except possibly  during the heyday of  the Radcliffe view, that 
governments and their policymakers are not or have not been jealous 
of their power to determine national monetary policy. 
Political unification would have to be well advanced for governments 
and their policymakers to be willing to yield monetary sovereignty to 
gold, a coalition of countries, a world central bank, or private money 
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down-to-earth. I conclude that the prospects for implementing the cur- 
rent proposals for a rule-based international monetary system are dim. 
16.4  How to Achieve an International Monetary 
System Constitution 
The literature on international macropolicy coordination and coop- 
eration has been growing apace. It is not primarily directed to the notion 
of a rule-based international monetary system. It rather embraces the 
view that international macropolicy coordination is justified on grounds 
analogous to market failures-the  existence of public goods, external- 
ities from the action of one government to the environment of another, 
monopoly power of certain governments-and  lags in reaching equi- 
librium that could be shortened by coordination (Cooper 1985). The 
types of studies reported in the literature include the case for coordi- 
nation given a positive-rather  than negative-pattern  of international 
transmission, game and control theoretical models of interaction among 
countries, dynamic versus static models of coordination. A sour view 
of these studies is that their results are either “rather obvious or rather 
obvious nonsense” (Marris 1985, p. 380). 
Essentially the studies bear on the question whether  cooperation 
between governments  would result  in higher real output and  lower 
inflation worldwide than would independent policies of  governments 
to achieve those goals. The authors of the studies tend to believe that 
representatives of  the industrialized  democracies working in tandem 
can nudge monetary growth rates, interest rates, exchange rates, and 
fiscal budgets in directions that would improve macroeconomic per- 
formance for all of them over what it would otherwise be. In their view, 
only the obduracy of short-sighted politicians prevents them from re- 
sponding to the demands of their peers to reshape their national policies. 
Even if  the authors of those studies possessed the requisite infor- 
mation about the structure of markets in the different countries, knew 
the quantitative  magnitude  of  key  structural parameters,  and could 
factor in differences in economic outlook of each country, there would 
still be a case against proceeding directly to coordinating policy. Di- 
vergent inflation rates, real growth rates, and unemployment rates among 
the industrialized democracies suggest that coordination would be fa- 
cilitated  if  each  country  initially  concentrated  on  narrowing  the 
divergences. 
In the EMS, it is true, divergences have not destroyed the monetary 
union, but there is otherwise greater homogeneity among the members 
and willingness to accept West Germany as the dominant country that 
characterizes the Summit group of countries. 406  Anna J. Schwartz 
The literature on coordination therefore leads me to the conclusion 
that the way to achieve an international monetary constitution is first 
to persuade individual countries to accept such a constitution. If per- 
suasion fails on the individual basis, a constitution for the international 
monetary system is illusory. 